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COURT OF APPEALS, 1957 TERM
further provided that violators could be prosecuted as disorderly persons. Held:
the defendant charged with violation was validly convicted. The fact that end of
speed zone signs were not up was not material since fair notice was given as to
what the limit was within the village. Whether or not the "disorderly persons"
portion of the ordinance was valid, defendant was not prosecuted thereunder and
12
this provision was severable; hence, defendant could not complain.'
Personal Summation By Defendant Not Allowed When Represented By Attorney
In People v. Richardson,"13 the defendant sought a reversal of a first degree
murder conviction upon the ground that although represented by counsel, he had
an absolute right to personally sum up to the jury. The Court held that no such
right existed. The Court equated the constitutional right that an accused "shall
11 4
be allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel as in civil actions"
to that right given a party in a civil suit. In a civil suit, a party has a right to
appear personally but if the party has an attorney his participation will be
allowed only at the discretion of the court." 5 The Court, in the Richardson case
found no abuse of the trial court's discretion in disallowing the defendant's
participation and accordingly affirmed the judgment for conviction. To take a
defendant's privilege to interfere out of the trial court's discretion would be
disruptive of orderly court procedure and the proper administration of justice."
Right to Counsel

-

Burden of Proof of Deprivation

In People v. Prior,1 17 the defendant was convicted and fined in a Police

Justice Court upon a plea of guilty to driving while intoxicated.1 8 On appeal t'o
County Court, the defendant stated in his affidavit of errors that "he did not have
the benefit of counsel" and alleged generally that "he was not fully advised of his
rights in the situation."
The Court of Appeals held that the defendant's allegation of "not having
benefit of counsel" did not constitute matter to which the Police Justice need
respond in his return."19 An allegation of "not having opportunity to secure
counsel," however, would suggest that benefit of counsel was not waived' 20 bur
deprived, thus requiring a specific response in the return of the police justice.
112. People v. Lathrop, 3 N.Y.2d 551, 170 N.Y.S.2d 326 (1958).
113. 4 N.Y.2d 224, 173 N.Y.S.2d 587 (1958).
114. N. Y. CONST., Art. I, §6.
115. N. Y. Civ. PRAc.AcT §236.
116. Compare Webb v. Dill, 18 Abb. Prac. 264 (1865).
117. 4 N.Y.2d 70, 172 N.Y.S.2d 155 (1958).
118. N. Y. VEHICLE AND TRAI'c LAw §70(5).
119. N. Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. §756. Also see People v. Marincic, 2 N.Y.2d
181, 158 N.Y.S.2d 569 (1957); 7 BuFFALo L. REv. 122 (1957).
120. N. Y. CODE CPIM.PROC. §§335(2), 699(4).
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Here, where the return of the police justice indicated that the defendant
was informed of all his rights, including the right to counsel, the return was
conclusive to all controverted matter within the police justice's knowledge in
1 21
the aL.sence of defendant's motion to correct alleged defects therein.

DECEDENTS ESTATES AND TRUSTS
Recovery by Execufor for Services of His Accounting Firm
The compensation which an executor or administrator is to receive for his
services to an estate is set by section 285 of the Surrogates Court Act at a percentage of the total value of the property which the executor or adminisrator
must handle in the course of his duties. This section makes provision for additional
compensation for executors and administrators in two instances. First, when the
executor or administrator is an attorney, he is allowed, in addition to his statutory
compensation, reasonable fees for necessary legal services which he has rendered
to the estate.1 Secondly, when an executor or administrator is called upon to
collect rents or manage property of the estate, he is allowed a fixed percentage of
the rents or income so derived. 2 If the services for which an executor requests
additional compensation do not fall within the provisions set forth above, the
additional compensation is generally denied.a However, this is not an inflexible
rule, and if special circumstances justify compensation, a reasonable amount will
be given. 4
In In re Tuttle's Estate,5 Thorny, an accountant-executor was decedent's
accountant for twelve years prior to decedents death, and at the time of death
was rendering services pertaining to an income tax deficiency suit in which
decedent was involved. Thorny did hot request or receive permission of the court
to continue the accounting services for the estate, but with the consent of the two
other executors and with no objection by decedent's widow (the principal beneficiary of the estate)' he completed his services in the income tax matter and made
an audit for the estate. After he had received payment for services rendered to
decedent prior, to his death and partial payment for the post death services,
decedenes widow began proceedings to oust Thorny as executor claiming that
his charges were excessive and constituted self-dealing. The surrogate found
Thorny's charges for the accounting services to be reasonable and allowed them.
121. N.Y. CoDE CRm. PRoc. §§757, 758.
1. N. Y. SuaRacATi's Couirr Acr §285(b)(7), N. Y. Civ. PpAc. Acr §1548(a).
2. N.Y. SURtROGATE'S CouRT Acr §285(b) (1).
3. Collier v. Munn, 41 N.Y. 143 (1869); In re Popp, 123 App.Dlv. 2, 107
N.Y. Supp. 277 (2d Dep't 1907).
4. Lent v. Howard, 89 N.Y. 169 (1882).
5. 4 N.Y.2d 159, 173 N.Y.S.2d 279 (1958).

